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Abstract 
In this paper we suggest a new measure of discretionary government spending for 
OECD countries over the period 1980-2011. To identify the components of 
discretionary expenditure, we use the volatility and persistence properties of the 
expenditure series. Discretionary policy cannot be inertial and should be free from 
prior obligations. Commonly used measures of discretionary fiscal policy do not 
satisfy these two criteria. We find that discretionary expenditure accounts on 
average for about 30 per cent of total primary expenditure, suggesting that most 
government spending is driven by inertial and automatic components. These 
features help explain why government expenditure is generally not counter-cyclical 
even in advanced economies. Furthermore, the small share of discretionary 
expenditure over total expenditure significantly reduces the room of manoeuvre for 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy during recessions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The depth of the output fall during the Great Recession has revived the interest in the role of fiscal 
stimulus, which has been endorsed even by paladins of fiscal rigour such as the IMF (IMF, 2010, 
2012a).  The broad consensus on the need of a fiscal stimulus has surely been affected by the fact 
that the last crisis was not a normal cyclical downturn but a deep recession, a rare event in OECD 
countries during the post-war era.  However, the simple observation of large budget deficits and 
soaring government debts during the Great Recession cannot be taken as a signal of an 
expansionary discretionary action by governments, since a large share of the deterioration in the 
fiscal accounts originated from the endogenous adjustment to the recession.   
 The debate on the fiscal stimulus has initially focused on fiscal multipliers.  However, with 
the passage of time, the nature of the stimulus and its temporariness has taken center stage.   
In the debate on the tightening of fiscal policy and its timing, especially in Europe, one element has 
often been overlooked, namely the fact that the adjustment mainly relied on the deliberate increase 
in tax revenue, rather than on the reduction in public expenditure (the most remarkable case is 
Italy).  This suggests that governments face severe obstacle in cutting back expenditure, which 
proves to be largely inertial, in contrast with textbook analyses and common approaches on 
cyclically adjusted budgets, which depict expenditure as almost entirely discretionary.  Our analysis 
focuses on government spending as revenues normally reflect their cyclical tax bases, and discretion 
is virtually confined to occasional tax rate changes and negligible lump-sum receipts.  
 The objective of this paper is precisely to measure the size and the nature of discretionary 
spending and link the notion of discretion to reversibility, thus temporariness, of changes in 
expenditure.   We believe that this is a crucial preliminary step to the analysis of the effects of fiscal 
variables on the economy.  Our notion of discretion is based on economic grounds and it goes 
beyond the legal/institutional aspects relating to the budgetary process, which are nevertheless 
extremely important (Elmendorf, 2011).1  Our approach share some similarities with methodologies 
applied for instance to the identification of exchange rate regimes, whereby de facto exchange rate 
regimes are derived from the properties of the actual time series of exchange rates rather than de 
jure definitions (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003). 
 When analyzing the role of fiscal policy in relation to economic fluctuations, not long run 
growth, one should focus on temporary expenditure, which can be easily reversed as economic 
conditions change.  By contrast, a large component of expenditure reflects entitlements associated 
                                                
1  Elmendorf, Director of  the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently stated: “Discretionary outlays—the part 
of federal spending that lawmakers generally control through annual appropriation acts—totaled about $1.35 trillion in 
2011, or close to 40 percent of federal outlays”. 
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to social contracts or political exchanges, which are hard to modify.  Not only these types of 
expenditures, such as health, education and pensions, are hard to change, but their use to achieve 
short-term stabilization is debatable.    
 Isolating discretionary policies is complicated as every spending component combines 
automatic, inertial and discretionary elements.  Undoubtedly, every item has at one point in time 
resulted from discretionary decisions, but once decisions are implemented they involve inertial 
dynamics, which varies depending on the type of expenditure.  Automatic components, such as 
unemployment benefits and income subsidies, respond – at least in principle - to the cyclical 
conditions of the economy.  However, often the automatic components are significantly modified 
during downturns, through for instance lengthening of the period of entitlement for unemployment 
benefits, and thus become discretionary rather than automatic.  
 As we illustrate in Section 2, three main approaches have been followed in the literature: 
first, discretionary expenditure is derived as expenditure adjusted for the component determined by 
cyclical fluctuations. Traditionally, such approach identifies only unemployment benefits as non-
discretionary expenditure2; second, discretionary expenditure is obtained from the estimated 
residuals of a total expenditure regression, determined by lagged expenditure (inertial component) 
and some subjective measure of economic activity to approximate cyclical components; third, 
discretionary expenditure is obtained through a  “narrative “ approach, focussing on a few selected 
episodes, mostly related to policy or administrative decisions. 
 The cyclically adjusted budget balance assumes that, except for unemployment benefits, all 
expenditure is discretionary and contributes to determine the so-called fiscal stance.   
At the other extreme we find the identification of discretionary expenditure with the (possibly) 
white noise residuals of an estimated expenditure equation.  In this approach, discretionary 
expenditure is thus a negligible proportion of total expenditure.   
  Identifying discretionary expenditure as residuals from an estimated equation has major 
drawbacks as it fails to distinguish the nature of different components of expenditure, which have 
different degrees of inertia or dependence on the cycle.  Moreover, in contrast with the above 
definition, discretionary spending may well react to the state of the economy.  Discretion and 
unpredictability are not synonymous. 
 Finally, the “narrative” approach, which isolates the policy decisions from a review of the 
actual behavior of policymakers is closer to our approach, as it emphasizes the diversity of various 
spending interventions.  However, the narrative approach is usually applied to a few large changes 
in policy decisions and does not apply to more systematic changes in spending to be evaluated on a 
                                                
2 Larch and Turrini (2009) indicate that the European Commission approach to evaluate fiscal stance still relies on a 
cyclically adjusted budget in which the only automatic expenditure is associated to unemployment benefits. 
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cyclical basis, using macroeconomic spending variables.  Furthermore, the narrative approach 
requires detailed information on actual decisions taken by governments and assumes that decisions 
taken are then implemented.  In fact, in the phase of implementation, fiscal plans are likely to 
change and the gaps between de jure and de facto measures may vary across countries depending on 
institutional and political features.  According to Elmendorf: “Congress specifies the amount of 
budget authority provided each year, but does not directly control when outlays occur” (Elmendorf, 
2011, p.3). 
 We develop a different measure of discretionary expenditure, which tries to avoid some of 
the drawbacks of the measures associated to the three approaches discussed above. In particular, we 
evaluate individual components of spending to identify those components that qualify as 
discretionary, assuming that a necessary condition for discretion is that expenditure has a low 
degree of inertia.  We then aggregate these components to derive our overall measure of 
discretionary expenditure.  This definition is consistent with the view that discretionary spending 
used to affect short-term output fluctuations has to be temporary.   
 One of the main findings from our analysis is that discretionary spending is a small 
component of overall primary expenditure, at around 30 percent in OECD countries.  This implies 
that when faced with the need to use fiscal policy to smooth temporary shocks to output, 
governments tend to have a small margin of manoeuvre.  Economists have generally indicated 
public debt as a burden for the freedom of manoeuvre of future governments.  We identify an 
additional source of constraint on the room of manoeuvre of governments, which is the high share 
of inertial and rigid expenditure.3  Interestingly, we find that during recessions discretionary 
spending does not always move more than non-discretionary spending and, moreover, in many 
instances it moves pro-cyclically4.  During recessions, including the Great Recession, this pro-
cyclicality appears stronger for countries facing tight fiscal constraints. 
 Of course, we do not claim that changes in expenditures that are persistent are irrelevant.  In 
fact, large changes in what we define non-discretionary spending are associated with fiscal reforms, 
often carried out in the wake of crises.  We have several examples of these phenomena during the 
Great Recession, especially in countries facing deep financial crises and debt crises.5   
                                                
3 Stuerle (2013) denotes the large share of rigid expenditure as lack of  ’’fiscal democracy’’, as it imposes tight 
constraints on action of future governments.   
4 In general, government spending has been shown to be acyclical or even procyclical also in developed countries 
(Fiorito, 1997; Lane, 2003). 
5 Example in the OECD area are the PIIGs and Iceland, and Latvia for the emerging countries. 
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 Large contractions in public sector employment and public sector wages occurred in these 
countries.6  According to our approach, these measures cannot be classified within the realm of 
short-term measures aimed at stabilizing the economy.  The fact that these changes occur during 
major crises indirectly confirms our view that non-discretionary spending is hard to modify in the 
short-run, except in exceptional circumstances. 
 In conclusion, we provide a measure of discretionary spending that is driven by the 
properties of different components of expenditure.  Our approach leads to a transparent and easy 
way to compute a measure of discretionary expenditure.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss major 
alternatives in measuring fiscal discretion in recent research. In Section 3 we present our approach. 
Section 4 contains the results of our analysis and Section 5 concludes.   
 
2.  Discretion in the empirical literature 
 
In this section we discuss in some detail the three main approaches to measuring fiscal discretion in 
the literature:  (1) the cyclically adjusted government balances, (2) residuals from feedback 
equations, and (3) event chronology (“narrative approach”). 
 
2.1 Cyclically adjusted balances 
 
The first approach refers to cyclically adjusted balances as a simple device for removing automatic 
stabilization from fiscal variables (Blanchard, 2003; Girouard and André, 2005).  Despite their wide 
use in both empirical studies and official documents7, adjusted balances have several limitations. 
First, they do not account for recessions.  Second, both corrected and uncorrected balances do not 
account for differences in government size (Table 3), which are important for characterizing fiscal 
policy in a structural way.  Finally and most importantly, the ability of adjusted balances to remove 
cyclical fluctuations is clearly overstated.  
 As Table 1 shows, the adjusted (CAPB) and unadjusted primary balances  (CAB) are 
strongly correlated.  Moreover, even though – as expected – adjusted balances are in most cases less 
volatile, adjusted and unadjusted budgets display similar degrees of persistence.  This is a severe 
                                                
6  Table 5a shows how large were in Iceland and Ireland contractions in the compensation of employees and, therefore, 
also in government consumption. 
7 Cyclically adjusted balances (CAB) or cyclically adjusted primary balances (CAPB) are widely used in IMF, Oecd 
and European Commission documents. Recently, the IMF “structural balances”  (SB) add to CAB other transitory 
factors like commodity and asset price fluctuations.  However, except for 2009, the differences between the CAB and 
the more subjective SB indicator are not empirically relevant (IMF, 2012b). 
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limitation, as variables associated to discretionary short-term policies should be less persistent than 
the unadjusted balances (see Section 3).  Of course, if one interprets the adjusted budget as the 
“structural” budget, which reflects long run structural features of expenditure and taxes, such as for 
instance the generosity of the social welfare system, the relevance of public education etc., one 
should also expect a higher degree of persistence of the adjusted than the unadjusted budget.  
However, in this interpretation, the use of the adjusted balance as an indicator of short-term 
discretionary measures taken by governments is meaningless.  
 
Table 1 - Primary balances and cyclically adjusted primary balances (CAPB) 
 
Country Range (1) Primary Balances (2) CAPB Correlation 
(1)-(2) Volatility Persistence Volatility Persistence 
Austria 1990-2011 1.44 8.4  (5) 1.10 8.5 (5) 0.84 
Belgium 1980-2011 3.80 54.1 (8) 3.41 46.0 (8) 0.97 
Denmark 1980-2011 3.82 49.4 (8) 2.93 49.7 (8) 0.97 
Finland 1980-2011 3.99 45.5 (8) 2.54 51.6 (8) 0.95 
France 1980-2011 1.54 24.3 (8) 1.12 37.2 (8) 0.88 
Iceland 1990-2011 4.32 9.7 (5) 4.06 5.2 (5) 0.94 
Ireland 1990-2011 6.48 15.7 (5) 3.75 35.7 (5) 0.84 
Italy 1980-2011 3.37 89.0 (8) 3.81 75.0 (8) 0.97 
Japan 1980-2009 3.34 60.3 (7) 3.00 64.5 (7) 0.99 
Netherlands 1980-2011 2.20 12.5 (8) 2.00 6.9 (8) 0.91 
Norway 1980-2012 2.35 46.1 (8) 2.36 43.3 (8) 1.00 
Spain 1980-2011 3.63 37.8 (8) 2.84 37.4 (8) 0.96 
Sweden 1980-2012 4.09 58.1 (8) 3.13 43.1 (8) 0.95 
UK 1980-2013 3.36 38.7 (8) 2.90 44.4 (8) 0.96 
US 1980-2014 3.17 31.5 (8) 2.71 40.3 (8) 0.98 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook  # 90. (EO90), November 2011.  Primary balance and CAPB are percentage ratios to actual and 
potential GDP, respectively. As in the rest of the paper, persistence is measured via the Ljung - Box (LB) χ2-statistics. The number in 
parenthesis refers to the number of autocorrelations for time series having a different length. 
 
 
2.2 Residuals from estimated spending equations 
 
The seminal contribution of this approach is Fatás and Mihov (2003), who estimate percentage 
changes in the government consumption/GDP ratio as a function of its lag, of real GDP changes and 
of a set of controls approximating institutional factors. Since the estimated residuals should be free 
from cyclical components, the authors interpret them as a measure of the discretionary spending in 
each country.  As in Galì (1994), this measure is then shown to be destabilizing in the resulting 
cross-section estimate.  Finally, Fatás and Mihov include in their panel both developed and 
developing countries even though, as shown in more recent studies, the two groups of countries 
seem to respond differently to the same fiscal stimuli (Ilzetzki et al., 2011). 
 Afonso et al. (2008) follow a similar approach, estimating government expenditure and 
revenues in levels, analyzing both developed and developing countries in the same panel.  As in 
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Fatás and Mihov, government consumption is labeled “government spending” and the estimated 
residuals are interpreted as discretionary impulses.  The same residual approach is also followed in 
a recent paper by Corsetti et al. (2012), where the panel is formed by more homogeneous Oecd 
countries and where regression controls include government debt, financial crises and exchange rate 
variables.  In line with previous studies, in Corsetti et al. as well estimated residuals from a 
government consumption equation are supposed to provide a reliable measure of the discretionary 
spending interventions. 
 In general, approximating discretion through the estimated residuals of a subjective equation 
confines discretionary spending to an unpredictable shock; and this happens in a single equation 
which cannot produce SVAR impulses, regardless if  they are more or less appropriate for the 
purpose.  Moreover, the fact that properly estimated residuals are not cyclical does not imply per se 
deliberate discretion.  Indeed, it is plausible that discretionary spending aims at improving the 
economy, i.e. that discretionary interventions should only be less cyclical than automatic stabilizers, 
but nevertheless responsive to and oriented towards economic conditions.   
 
2.3 Event studies 
 
The third approach measures discretionary policy from policy interventions or intentions, taken 
directly from laws, government enforcement, presidential speeches and alike.  This “narrative 
approach” was first used by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to extract data from announcements and 
policy decisions.  The approach has also been adopted by Romer and Romer (2010) in their postwar 
reconstruction on tax legislation in the US, which shows that discretionary interventions have 
stronger effects than those obtained by cyclical adjustments.8  Finally, this methodology was used 
by Ramey (2011) to evaluate the impact of  “spending news”, which appear more reliable than 
SVAR impulses. 
 
The narrative approach is surely promising, as it measures directly policy decisions that are unlikely 
to be captured by cyclically adjusted balances or particular regression residuals.  However, the 
approach has some limitations, because laws and policy statements identify policy intentions that 
not always result in approved budget decisions. Moreover, some of the proposals are not precise 
enough in terms of the involved funding to be approved, and approved budget decisions do not 
                                                
8 In general, the reconstruction of events is costly, especially when the sample includes countries with different 
languages.  This explains why until recently the approach was mainly used for the US. However, two recent IMF 
studies (IMF, 2010; Devries et al., 2011) provide cross-national evidence. 
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necessarily imply that actual spending is the same as the approved spending in the reference year 
(Elmendorf, 2011).  Finally, accrual accounting complicates the analysis of government spending in 
relation to GDP and other macroeconomic variables.   
 All these limitations make subjective and possibly arbitrary the reconstruction of the 
selected episodes, as it is difficult to separate actual decisions from mere announcements.  In 
addition, announcements, even if not immediately or consistently followed by corresponding 
decisions, may equally affect expectations and then market outcomes.  
 Finally, even if the proposed events can at least produce reasonable dummies, it is difficult 
to reconstruct in this way how fiscal policy can exert discretion in a more continuous way, as the 
magnitude of discretionary expenditure depends on the composition of expenditure and on the 
working of inside and outside lags, which affect actual policy outcomes (Blinder, 2006).    
  
3. Discretionary spending: A new measure 
 
Discretionary and non-discretionary spending are artificial constructs, as they do not have any 
reference to the national accounts.  However, they play a key role in representing how fiscal policy 
works.  Automatic stabilizers do not require policy makers to have knowledge of the current state of 
the economy and, more importantly, to have political consensus.  By contrast, discretionary 
spending assumes an adequate knowledge of the current and perspective economic conditions.  
Furthermore, discretion is generally based on the political commitment to improve, more or less 
immediately, the state of the economy.   
 A possible clue for separating discretionary from automatic expenditures arises from the fact 
that legal and political constraints make most components of expenditure de facto unavailable for 
deliberate control.  Indeed, several types of government spending follow some sort of obligations, 
which go beyond the interest payments on debt.  Our main assumption is that discretionary 
expenditure is not compatible with rigid obligations, which make outlays inertial after a spending 
decision is made.  Looking at disaggregate expenditures classified by uses would help to identify 
the degree of potential inertia in different spending categories. However, this approach would be 
potentially arbitrary. 
 To reduce the scope for arbitrariness, rather than a “legalistic” approach - often used by the 
event methodology – we adopt an economic perspective relying on the time series properties of 
various components of expenditure.  Given that obligations deriving from social contracts lead to 
persistent spending, we distinguish discretionary from non-discretionary spending by evaluating the 
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persistence and volatility derived from the univariate time-series properties of each, de-trended, 
expenditure component.   
 We base our definition and measurement of discretionary spending on a few, rather intuitive, 
assumptions: 
 
i. Discretion cannot be inertial  
 
Since current policy decisions do not simply, or necessarily, complete past decisions, discretionary 
spending should be less persistent than automatic stabilizers. In addition, there is no reason that 
discretionary spending must behave like a white noise process.9  
We test the persistence requirement by applying Ljung-Box statistics to the univariate cyclical 
components of each type of spending. Our candidate discretionary variables should be less 
persistent than the other spending variables. 
 
ii. Discretion does not imply obligations   
 
Discretionary spending should rest more on choice than on obligations.  In reality, several 
expenditures imply several types of obligations (e.g. debt payments, compensation of employees, 
social security pensions), regardless of whether these obligations are legal10, contractual or plainly 
moral in nature.  Empirically, the absence or the presence of less stringent obligations should not 
only imply a lower persistence but also a higher volatility relative to more automatic types of 
spending, due to cyclical factors and to the transmission of previous shocks. Thus, combining low 
persistence and high volatility could provide a reasonable signal for detecting discretion, 
independently of any particular theoretical assumption. 
 
iii. Discretion must be temporary  
 
Policy interventions should reflect discrete and reversible choices, i.e. temporary spending 
decisions that democratic governments can legally start and cancel.11   Therefore, temporary 
                                                
9 For instance, public investments or other time-to-build projects need more than one period to be implemented and 
completed. 
10Conversely, in an analysis of discretionary spending trends in the  US for instance, “essentially all spending on federal 
wages and salaries is discretional” (Austin and Levit, 2010, p.3). We do not follow here this wide sense ‘legal’ 
definition in favor of a more economic interpretation to be tested against detailed cyclical evidence.  
11 In principle, government could also establish ex ante rules ensuring that the relevant expenditure is implemented 
when certain conditions occur, for instance a fall in GDP, an increase in unemployment or an increase in inflation. 
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decisions reconcile the lack of persistence requirement with the assumption that (well-behaved) 
discretionary spending should pursue temporary and reversible goals. Furthermore, temporary 
decisions do not have to behave like a white noise process because temporary are not necessarily 
instantaneous interventions to be completed in the same period in which a decision is taken: outside 
lags in general and time-to-build technologies for capital spending imply some persistence, required 
at least by the completion time. 
 
3.1. Candidates for discretion 
 
Given the above assumptions, we identify ex ante discretionary expenditure on the basis of their 
purpose since certain outlays reflect per se less obligations than others, including the need of being 
protracted over time.  However, for empirical analysis, general government spending is considered 
here by NIPA variable (see Table 2) rather than by function (e.g. defense, health etc.), though 
spending variables such as wages, investment, interest etc., are easily related to economic purposes, 
more or less likely to reflect implicit or explicit obligations. 12    
 We then look at the time-series properties of the candidate variables to verify that they differ 
from those found for the other, non-discretionary, expenditures. To do so we use stationary, 
cyclical, data for assessing in a model-free way the univariate properties of each spending variable 
in each country.   
 
3.2.  Discretion, persistence and volatility of expenditure time series. 
 
We first computed the cyclical component of each expenditure item using the HP filter.  Our chosen 
series relate to real expenditure variables rather than to expenditure/GDP ratios like in Fatás and 
Mihov, and Afonso (2008).  Scaling expenditure by GDP, while ensuring stationarity of the series, 
is not an innocuous normalization if the objective is to identify discretionary policy.  Indeed, the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio varies as a result of changes in GDP.  Moreover, as GDP itself is affected 
by government expenditure, scaling expenditure by GDP creates a circularity in the measure of 
expenditure dynamics. 
 We analyzed the autocorrelation function for each cyclical expenditure component and for 
two aggregate measures, discretionary and non-discretionary spending, defined according to our 
priors based on persistence and volatility patterns.  If a series lacks any persistence - i.e. if the series 
                                                                                                                                                            
Musgrave (1959) defined such rule-based discretion as “formula flexibility”, which recently regained consensus in the 
literature.  
12 This is less obvious in the case of government consumption that includes several functions or types of services. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.33
 11 
is a white noise process - the coefficients of autocorrelation will be zero at all lags.  We then 
evaluated the presence of persistence in the series through the Ljung-Box statistics, whose value 
increases along with the degree of persistence.  However, the persistence of a time-series affects 
also its variance.  Consider the simplest case of an AR(1) process  y(t)= ρ y(t-1) + ε(t) , with finite 
variance of the disturbance term (0 < σ2(ε) < ∞). The volatility of any covariance-stationary variable 
(y) rises with the process persistence defined in this case by the parameter ρ:  var(y) =  σ2/(1 - ρ2) ,  
0 <ρ <1. 
 In addition, we use the standard deviation as a comparable, scale-free, measure of volatility 
for cyclical, zero-mean, variables.  As the volatility of a series is affected by the degree of 
persistence of the series, we construct as our preferred measure of the degree of discretion an 
indicator of volatility corrected for the persistence of the series. Therefore, our summary criterion of  
“deflated volatility” is simply obtained dividing the volatility of each variable  (standard deviation) 
by the Ljung-Box statistics, which measures the degree of persistence of the series. 
 Discretion is characterized here by low persistence and high volatility. This is not a 
contradiction if volatility originates from abrupt spending decisions rather than from long 
transmission of the interventions over time.  We consider the volatility and persistence of each 
spending variable.  Such analysis is then applied to an ex ante distinction between discretionary and 
non-discretionary expenditures based on our priors.  The analysis of volatility/persistence is crucial 
to validate our priors.  Starting from individual expenditure series for each country, we derive total 
discretionary expenditure simply adding up the individual discretionary series. 
 Our candidate variables satisfying the lack of obligation requirement are subsidies, 
purchases and capital spending.  Thus, we exclude from discretion not only interest payments, but 
also compensation of employees and transfers, which are in most cases dominated by pensions.  
This means that we exclude from discretionary spending the non-pension components as well (e.g., 
mainly unemployment and welfare benefits), which behave more as a persistent cyclical component 
than as an occasional labor market intervention.  Thus, government discretionary spending (GD) is 
obtained adding the following components: 
 
(1) GD = TSUB + CGNW +  [IG + TKPG], 
where the expression in brackets is total  capital expenditure  [IG + TKPG],  i.e. the sum of  fixed 
investment (IG)  and capital transfers (TKPG); TSUB and CGNW denote subsidies to firms and 
government consumption purchases, respectively (see Statistical Appendix). 
 To validate the robustness of our definition, we also tried and tested minor accounting 
differences: subtracting from capital expenditure a negligible lump-sum receipt component 
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(TKTRG), or confining capital expenditure to fixed investment only.   Since these and other small 
variants do not significantly affect the pattern of the resulting discretionary aggregate, we 
maintained definition (1), providing separate information for the two capital spending 
components.13 
 Moreover, discretionary spending has been calculated by adding the relevant components 
both in nominal and in real terms.  Nominal variables have been used to calculate the discretionary 
share with respect total government expenditure and nominal GDP  [Tables 2 and 5].   Nominal 
variables have been deflated to calculate real expenditure series from which obtaining the 
persistence and volatility of their cyclical components that we used for evaluating whether actual 
series conform to our priors.  Deflation is important because the relevant price deflators vary 
significantly across expenditure items. Subsidies (TSUB) in volume are obtained by means of the 
GDP deflator, while for the two capital expenditure components we used the fixed investment 
deflator. As far as purchases (CGNW) are concerned, they are derived as the difference between 
government consumption (CG) deflated by the consumption deflator (taken from the OECD) and 
wage expenditure (CGW) deflated by the private consumption deflator (see Statistical Appendix). 
 
4.  Results 
 
We first present some background data that should help to interpret features and implications of our 
suggested measure. 
 
4.1 Stylized facts 
 
Tables 2a and 2b summarize the distribution of government spending in all countries, while Table 3 
displays information on the government size and the debt burden. Overall, government spending 
declined over time, although the Great Recession reversed this tendency, mainly in those countries 
where deficits and debt constraints were less binding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 This additional information is available upon request. 
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Table 2a - Government Expenditure by variable (% of Total Government Spending)   
Country (1) 
Purchases 
(2) 
Investment 
(3) 
Capital 
transfers 
(4) 
Subsidies 
(5) 
Welfare 
(6) 
Pensions 
(7) 
Wages 
 
(8) 
Interests 
(9)=(1)+(7) 
Government 
Consumption 
(10)=(5)+(6) 
Social 
Security 
 Discretionary Spending Non-Discretionary Spending --- --- 
Austria           
1990-99 15.4 5.4 3.9 6.2 13.6 24.1 23.8 7.5 39.2 37.7 
2000-08 18.9 2.6 5.2 7.1 13.4 26.1 20.2 6.5 39.1 39.5 
2009-11 19.8 2.3 5.5 7.2 15.4 24.5 19.8 5.5 39.6 39.9 
           
Belgium           
1980-89 16.8 5.6 3.0 4.3 14.3 16.5 23.0 16.5 39.8 30.8 
1990-99 18.6 3.6 2.3 2.6 13.3 18.5 22.9 18.2 41.5 31.8 
2000-08 22.1 3.5 2.9 3.1 14.1 18.8 25.0 10.5 47.0 32.9 
2009-11 23.2 3.3 2.8 4.6 16.2 17.8 24.9 7.1 47.9 34.0 
           
Denmark           
1980-89 15.8 4.2 2.2 2.9 21.7 8.7 32.5 12.1 48.3 30.4 
1990-99 14.9 3.2 1.3 4.7 23.0 10.4 31.9 10.5 46.8 33.4 
2000-08 17.7 3.7 1.0 4.7 21.6 11.0 35.4 5.1 53.1 32.6 
2009-11 19.2 3.9 1.2 4.9 20.8 10.6 35.8 3.5 55.0 31.4 
           
Finland           
1980-89 15.1 8.6 1.6 7.4 15.6 16.6 34.5 0.5 49.6 32.2 
1990-99 15.3 6.0 2.2 5.0 22.6 16.9 30.5 1.6 45.8 39.5 
2000-08 19.1 5.8 0.8 3.1 17.9 18.6 30.3 4.5 49.4 36.5 
2009-11 20.7 5.4 0.9 2.9 19.0 17.4 29.3 4.2 50.0 36.4 
           
France           
1980-89 19.7 6.8 1.9 4.7 13.8 21.3 27.5 4.5 47.2 35.1 
1990-99 20.1 6.5 2.4 3.2 11.9 23.3 26.3 6.3 46.4 35.2 
2000-08 20.7 6.3 1.9 3.0 10.9 24.8 26.7 5.7 47.4 35.7 
2009-11 21.6 6.1 1.8 3.2 12.2 24.8 25.6 4.6 47.2 37.0 
           
Iceland           
1990-99 21.3 10.4 4.9 5.6 11.2 5.7 31.7 9.3 53.0 16.7 
2000-08 22.7 9.6 4.7 4.5 9.9 5.0 37.0 6.7 59.7 14.9 
2009-11 23.6 6.7 6.0 3.8 11.1 5.5 30.8 12.6 54.4 16.6 
           
Ireland           
1990-99 17.4 6.4 3.6 2.7 20.7 9.2 26.1 13.9 43.5 29.9 
2000-08 20.9 12.3 3.3 1.8 18.3 10.5 28.8 4.1 49.7 28.8 
2009-11 14.0 7.5 20.7 1.0 22.5 6.8 22.8 4.7 36.0 29.3 
           
Italy           
1980-89 14.8 6.9 3.6 5.3 7.5 22.4 24.0 15.5 30.8 29.9 
1990-99 14.6 4.9 3.2 3.0 8.2 23.6 22.4 20.2 37.0 31.8 
2000-08 18.8 4.9 3.5 2.3 6.5 29.6 23.0 11.4 41.8 36.1 
2009-11 20.2 4.6 3.3 2.2 10.2 28.2 22.4 9.0 42.6 38.4 
Note:  (1) = CGNW; (2) = IGAA; (3) = TKPG; (4) = TSUB; (5) = Welfare; (6) = Pensions; (7) = CGW; (8) = GGINT; 
(9) = CG; (10) = SSPG. For the exact definition, see the Appendix. 
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Table 2b - Government Expenditure by variable (% of Total Government Spending) 
Country (1) 
Purchases 
(2) 
Investment 
(3) 
Capital 
transfers 
(4) 
Subsidies 
(5) 
Welfare 
(6) 
Pensions 
(7) 
Wages 
 
(8) 
Interests 
(9)=(1)+(7) 
Government 
Consumption 
(10)=(5)+(6) 
Social 
Security 
Japan Discretionary Spending Non-Discretionary Spending --- --- 
1980-89 22.3 15.3 5.5 3.5 7.7 14.1 19.9 11.6 42.2 21.8 
1990-99 24.2 16.1 7.1 2.3 6.5 16.6 17.4 9.8 41.6 23.1 
2000-08 30.0 10.4 4.6 2.0 7.2 21.9 16.7 7.1 46.7 29.1 
           
Netherlands           
1980-89 20.5 6.2 3.7 3.8 22.3 11.1 22.6 9.8 43.1 33.4 
1990-99 25.6 6.3 1.8 3.3 19.1 12.0 20.9 10.9 46.5 31.1 
2000-08 33.9 7.8 0.8 3.1 14.2 11.5 22.4 6.2 56.3 25.7 
2009-11 38.0 7.6 2.7 3.1 14.2 9.6 20.7 4.2 58.7 23.8 
           
Norway           
1990-99 16.0 7.2 1.0 7.8 21.0 11.6 29.8 5.7 45.8 32.6 
2000-08 18.9 7.1 0.4 5.2 21.1 12.1 31.5 3.8 50.4 33.2 
2009-11 20.0 8.0 0.1 5.0 20.3 11.6 31.9 3.2 51.9 31.9 
           
Spain           
1980-89 14.8 8.2 11.8 2.8 12.4 18.5 25.8 5.8 40.6 30.9 
1990-99 15.7 9.1 5.8 2.3 10.7 20.3 25.8 10.2 41.5 31.0 
2000-08 20.1 9.5 3.8 2.8 9.5 21.6 26.8 5.9 46.9 31.1 
2009-11 20.8 9.3 3.0 2.6 14.5 19.1 26.7 4.1 47.5 33.6 
           
Sweden           
1980-89 15.6 7.1 1.5 6.3 15.8 13.2 32.3 8.2 47.9 29.0 
1990-99 17.5 5.9 1.1 5.6 19.4 13.7 29.1 7.7 46.6 33.1 
2000-08 21.9 6.1 0.3 2.9 18.6 14.8 31.0 4.5 52.9 33.4 
2009-11 24.9 7.0 0.2 3.0 17.9 14.6 30.2 2.2 55.1 32.5 
           
UK           
1980-89 19.6 4.9 4.0 2.7 17.5 12.4 28.2 10.8 47.8 29.9 
1990-99 21.3 4.6 2.9 1.4 21.8 13.1 26.8 8.2 48.1 34.9 
2000-08 25.5 4.1 2.6 1.1 19.1 14.1 27.8 5.7 53.3 33.2 
2009-11 25.7 5.6 4.3 0.9 21.2 11.8 25.2 5.2 50.9 33.0 
           
USA           
1980-89 18.2 10.2 0.0 1.4 10.0 17.8 29.7 12.6 47.9 27.8 
1990-99 15.6 9.3 0.2 1.3 14.3 17.6 28.6 13.1 44.2 31.9 
2000-08 17.1 9.4 0.7 1.3 17.0 17.6 28.4 8.6 45.5 34.6 
2009-11 16.5 8.8 2.4 1.0 21.0 17.2 26.4 6.5 42.9 38.2 
Note:  (1) = CGNW; (2) = IGAA; (3) = TKPG; (4) = TSUB; (5) = Welfare; (6) = Pensions; (7) = CGW; (8) = GGINT; 
(9) = CG; (10) = SSPG. For the exact definition, see the Appendix. 
 
 
Government consumption (CG) is everywhere the largest public spending variable, followed almost 
everywhere by social security (SSPG) which contains pensions and welfare expenditures.14  Social 
spending seems mostly made by pensions, with the exception of the Northern countries, Ireland and 
the UK where welfare transfers dominate (Table 3).  
                                                
14  Austria is the exception, since government consumption and social security spending have about the same size.  
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Table 3 -  Revenues, Government Spending and Debt Size (% of  nominal GDP) 
Country TY GY GSIZE BY Country TY GY GSIZE BY 
Austria     Japan     
1990-99 50.8 49.8 100.6 64.4 1980-89 31.2 33.3 64.5 65.1 
2000-08 49.1 47.4 96.5 69.5 1990-99 32.0 35.7 67.7 86.8 
2009-11 48.4 49.1 97.5 77.4 2000-08 32.3 38.3 70.6 160.4 
          
Belgium     Netherlands     
1980-89 47.1 57.0 104.1 108.2 1980-89 52.6 56.4 109 79.1 
1990-99 47.6 50.8 98.4 130.6 1990-99 48.9 49.9 98.8 86.2 
2000-08 49.2 47.6 96.8 100.4 2000-08 45.1 42.7 87.8 59.8 
2009-11 48.5 50.3 98.8 100.1 2009-11 46.2 48.4 94.6 70.2 
          
Denmark     Norway     
1980-89 52.6 54.5 107.1 72.1 1990-99 54.3 47.7 102.0 31.4 
1990-99 55.7 54.3 110.0 77.6 2000-08 57.5 40.7 98.2 46.9 
2000-08 55.8 49.2 105.0 50.2 2009-11 57.0 42.7 99.7 51.7 
2009-11 55.6 54.1 109.7 54.7      
          
Finland     Spain     
1980-89 48.5 40.2 88.7 17.2 1980-89 33.8 38.8 72.6 41.6 
1990-99 55.6 50.8 106.4 51.6 1990-99 38.5 43.0 81.5 64.4 
2000-08 53.3 44.1 97.4 47.9 2000-08 38.9 47.9 86.8 53.8 
2009-11 52.3 48.8 101.1 56.8 2009-11 36.0 43.7 79.7 68.0 
          
France     Sweden     
1980-89 47.4 47.6 95.0 35.3 1980-89 59.9 57.8 117.7 61.6 
1990-99 49.0 50.0 99.0 56.7 1990-99 59.8 59.1 118.9 73.9 
2000-08 50.0 49.3 99.3 71.4 2000-08 55.2 49.8 105.0 57.8 
2009-11 49.7 52.4 102.1 94.8 2009-11 52.9 49.0 101.9 49.1 
          
Iceland     UK     
1990-99 38.7 40.6 61.2 75.4 1980-89 42.9 44.3 87.2 47.1 
2000-08 44.5 41.6 86.1 68.9 1990-99 38.7 40.6 79.3 45.4 
2009-11 41.0 46.4 87.4 124.0 2000-08 40.4 38.5 78.9 45.4 
     2009-11 40.2 45.5 85.7 81.5 
          
Ireland     USA     
1990-99 39.4 37.7 77.1 57.1 1980-89 32.1 35.5 67.6 52.6 
2000-08 35.1 32.1 67.2 35.7 1990-99 33.7 35.2 68.9 67.7 
2009-11 35.2 50.2 85.4 94.0 2000-08 33.1 34.2 67.3 60.4 
     2009-11 31.6 39.9 71.5 92.3 
Italy          
1980-89 37.3 47.8 85.1 90.4      
1990-99 44.7 51.2 95.9 117.6      
2000-08 44.7 46.5 91.2 117.3      
2009-11 46.2 49.5 95.7 126.9      
           Note: TY = Total Revenues/GDP; GY =  Total Government spending/GDP); GSIZE =  (TY + GY)/GDP;  
         BY =  Government Debt/GDP.  All variables are in nominal terms and refer to General Government definition. 
 
 
 
 
However, government consumption cannot be considered representative of all public expenditure 
for two main reasons: the first is that government consumption ranges between 40% and 50% of 
total spending. The second is that government consumption is a heterogeneous aggregate formed for 
about 2/3 by the compensation of employees (CGW), and for the rest by government purchases 
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(CGNW), having a well-known different pattern over the business cycle, which is also confirmed 
by our results. The sum of government consumption and social security is about 80% of total 
general government spending, though there are again differences among countries.  
 Capital spending is the third, much smaller but also more volatile, component obtained by 
the sum of fixed investment (IGAA) and capital transfers (TKPG).  Public investment is relatively 
low in all countries, except for Japan where it exceeds 10% of total public spending. 
 
4.2 Evidence from time-series analysis by variable and country 
 
We first derive the cyclical component of each spending variable in volume through the HP filter.15  
We then analyze and compare the autoregressive properties of each de-trended series and of the 
implied discretionary (GD) and non-discretionary (GN) aggregates. As stated before, our testable 
prior is that discretionary expenditure has a lower persistence and a higher volatility with respect to 
the other components, inertial or automatic.   Table 4 reports for all spending variables the relevant 
statistics, which include the ratio between volatility and persistence (Dvol), introduced to deflate 
volatility from what is due to persistence.  Comparing first the same variable by country, we see 
that purchases (CGNW) are – as expected - more volatile (Vol) than the wage component of 
government consumption (CGW). Capital expenditure volatility is a well-known business cycle 
stylized fact that applies also to public spending. Capital transfers (KTPG) are per se extremely 
volatile while fixed investment volatility reflects not only the discrete type of decisions involved 
but also the persistence induced by its time-to-build feature. 16  
 The last discretionary variable in our scheme is given by subsidies, which indicate current, 
unrequited, payments made to private firms.  Given the policy nature of this variable, it is not 
surprising that the relevant statistics widely differ across countries.  In most cases, however, 
subsidies are persistent and their deflated volatility is smaller than that found for the other 
discretionary components. 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 As in Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we use for annual data a 6.25 smoothing parameter. Using different parameters, 
however, results do not change remarkably. 
16 A good example is given by the experience of Ireland and Iceland, characterized by strong policy interventions to 
alleviate recent crisis. 
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Table 4. - Volatility (Vol) and persistence (LB) of  government spending variables 
Austria  
1990-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(5) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Belgium  
1980-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Purchases 3.15 5.77  .55 Purchases 1.77 13.3 .13 
Fixed investment 5.82 5.26 1.11 Fixed investment 5.28 34.3 .15 
Capital transfers 19.6 9.53 2.06 Capital  transfers 28.9 16.5 1.75 
Subsidies 3.84 15.9 .24 Subsidies 5.23 8.65 .60 
Welfare 5.71 10.5 .54 Welfare 2.89 26.6 .11 
Interests 2.83 8.66 .33 Interests 4.18 15.2 .27 
Pensions 1.01 7.77 .13 Pensions 1.11 11.5 .10 
Wages 2.13 11.8 .18 Wages 1.18 8.74 .13 
SSPG (Social 
Security) Shares 
Pensions: 64%  
Welfare: 36%  
SSPG (Social 
Security) Shares 
Pensions: 56%  
Welfare: 44% 
Denmark 
1980-2011 
Vol LB (8) 
 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Finland 
 1980-2011 
Vol LB(8) (3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Purchases 1.89 27.4 .07 Purchases 1.75 23.4 .07 
Fixed investment 6.59 17.6 .37 Fixed investment 5.09 20.7 .25 
Capital transfers    Capital transfers 32.1 14.3 2.24 
Subsidies 5.58 10.4 .54 Subsidies 3.52 14.3 .25 
Welfare 3.04 34.5 .09 Welfare 4.87 12.7 .38 
Interests 6.00 12.4 .48 Interests 7.78 18.5 .42 
Pensions 2.65 8.31 .31 Pensions 2.37 14.7 .16 
Wages 1.34 27.8 .05 Wages 1.99 32.4 .06 
SSPG (Social 
Security) Shares 
Pensions: 31%  
Welfare: 69% 
SSPG (Social 
Security) Shares 
Pensions: 48%  
Welfare: 52% 
    
France  
1980-2011 
(1)  
Vol 
(2) 
 LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Iceland 
 1990-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(5) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Purchases 1.18 21.1 .06 Purchases 3.70 23.9 .15 
Fixed investment 2.78 6.48 .43 Fixed investment 11.1 16.0 .69 
Capital transfers 8.94 14.4 6.20 Capital transfers 57.0 11.8 4.84 
Subsidies 4.05 21.5 .19 Subsidies 4.72 3.85 1.23 
Welfare 3.02 10.1 2.99 Welfare 5.21 15.7 .33 
Interests 4.45 3.78 1.18 Interests 10.6 7.41 1.43 
Pensions .91 8.88 .10 Pensions 3.85 8.61 .45 
Wages .76 12.2 .06 Wages 2.58 12.8 .20 
SSPG (Social 
Security)  
Shares 
Pensions: 65% 
Welfare: 35% 
SSPG (Social 
Security)  
Shares 
Pensions: 33% 
Welfare: 67 
Ireland  
1990-2011 
Vol LB(5) (3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Italy 
1980-2011 
Vol LB(8) (3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Purchases 3.34 19.5 .17 Purchases 2.20 10.1 .22 
Fixed investment 8.97 24.7 .36 Fixed investment 6.35 6.76 .94 
Capital transfers 50.7 2.30 22.0 Capital transfers 30.8 8.12 3.79 
Subsidies 7.39 15.0 .49 Subsidies 4.59 12.9 .36 
Welfare 5.14 11.5 .45 Welfare 8.07 12.0 .67 
Interests 5.45 7.27 .75 Interests 5.57 20.3 .27 
Pensions 4.15 11.5 .36 Pensions 2.63 8.73 .30 
Wages 1.78 8.18 .22 Wages 2.07 7.91 .26 
SSPG (Social 
Security)  
Shares 
Pensions: 31% 
Welfare: 69% 
SSPG (Social 
Security)  
Shares 
Pensions: 76% 
Welfare: 24% 
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Table 4 continued- Volatility (Vol) and persistence (LB) of  government spending variables 
Japan  
1980-2008 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(7) 
 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Netherlands 
 1980-2011 
(1)  
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Purchases 1.35 21.3 .06 Purchases 1.91 7.93 .24 
Fixed investment 3.14 18.5 .17 Fixed investment 2.97 10.8 .27 
Capital transfers 25.5 21.8 1.17 Capital transfers    
Subsidies 6.44 13.2 .49 Subsidies 8.87 12.2 .73 
Welfare 3.57 6.93 .52 Welfare 2.84 15.3 .19 
Interests 2.01 26.4 .08 Interests 3.20 18.8 .17 
Pensions .96 9.67 .10 Pensions 2.18 11.5 .19 
Wages .60 24.2 .02 Wages 1.32 26.5 .05 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 70% 
Welfare: 30% 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 62% 
Welfare: 38% 
Norway 
1980-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Spain 
1980-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Purchases 1.69 22.7 .07 Purchases 2.37 15.8 .15 
Fixed investment 4.98 16.6 .30 Fixed investment 6.72 15.5 .43 
Capital transfers 49.4 17.4 2.84 Capital transfers 10.6 8.77 1.21 
Subsidies 4.34 14.3 .30 Subsidies 6.84 15.9 .43 
Welfare 2.59 12.5 .21 Welfare 5.19 15.7 .33 
Interests 7.14 9.95 .72 Interests 7.69 30.3 .25 
Pensions 1.88 6.69 .28 Pensions 1.12 12.2 .09 
Wages .99 9.50 .10 Wages 1.97 14.4 .14 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions:  36% 
Welfare: 64% 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 64% 
Welfare: 36% 
Sweden  
1980-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
UK  
1980-2011 
Vol LB(8) (3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
Purchases 2.18 7.93 .27 Purchases 1.49 14.2 .10 
Fixed investment 3.52 7.90 .45 Fixed investment 18.1 4.45 4.07 
Subsidies 3.37 38.3 .88 Subsidies 7.40 8.97 .82 
Welfare 3.03 19.9 .15 Welfare 4.02 19.0 .21 
Interests 7.66 9.90 .77 Interests 6.90 5.60 1.23 
Pensions 1.82 9.49 .19 Pensions 1.53 9.48 .16 
Wages 1.78 12.7 .14 Wages 1.28 22.8 .06 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 44% 
Welfare:  56% 
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 40% 
Welfare:  60% 
USA  
1980-2011 
(1)  
Vol 
(2) 
LB(8) 
(3)=(1)/(2) 
DVol 
    
Purchases 1.29 6.26 .21     
Fixed investment 2.64 27.8 .09     
Subsidies 8.34 17.9 .47     
Welfare 3.57 17.7 .20     
Interests 3.89 27.8 .14     
Pensions 1.14 6.53 .17     
Wages 0.80 20.0 .04     
SSPG (Social Security) 
Shares 
Pensions: 55% 
Welfare: 45% 
  
Source: OECD cit. Data are HP  annual cycles; LB(p):  Ljung Box χ2(p)  statistics; Dvol = Deflated volatility;  
Discretionary variables are in bold; Purchases: Non-wage Gov.t Consumption; (CGNW); Fixed Investment =  Gov.t 
fixed investment (IGAA); Capital transfers: TKPG; Subsidies = Subsidies to firms (SUB); Welfare =  Social Security 
(SSPG) – Pensions; Interests = Gross Gov.t Interest Payments (GGINTP);  Pensions = old age + survivors spending 
cash benefits (Social Expenditure Database); Wages =  Gov.t Final Wage Consumption (CGW).  More details can be 
found in the Appendix. 
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As far as the non-discretionary spending is concerned, the welfare component is generally 
characterized by a high degree of cyclicality (Adema et al., 2011) and by a degree of persistence 
that is inconsistent with the standard view that this type of expenditure should reflect temporary 
interventions. Conversely, all the other evidence matches our assumptions, including the fact that 
pensions and wages are very persistent, while interests on debt are volatile too. 
 
4.3 Aggregate evidence 
 
On the basis of our definition, the share of discretionary spending (GD) is about 1/3 of total 
government spending in the OECD (Table 5).   
 
Table 5 - Discretionary (GD) and non-discretionary spending (GN), % of GDP 
Country 1980-89 1990-99 2000-08 2009-11 
GD GN GY GD GN GY GD GN GY GD GN GY 
Austria  
 
- - - 31.0 69.0 49.8 33.8 66.2 47.4 34.8 65.2 49.1 
Belgium  
 
29.7 70.3 57.0 27.1 72.9 50.8 31.6 68.4 47.6 33.9 66.1 50.3 
Denmark 
 
25.0 75.0 54.5 24.2 75.8 54.3 27.0 73.0 49.2 29.2 70.8 54.1 
Finland 
 
32.7 67.3 40.2 28.4 71.6 50.8 28.8 71.2 44.1 30.0 70.0 48.8 
France 
 
33.0 67.0 47.6 32.2 67.8 50.0 31.9 68.1 49.3 32.7 67.3 52.4 
Iceland 
 
- - - 42.2 57.8 40.6 41.5 58.5 41.6 40.0 60.0 46.4 
Ireland 
 
- - - 30.1 69.9 37.7 38.3 61.7 32.1 43.2 56.8 50.2 
Italy 
 
30.6 69.4 47.8 25.7 74.3 51.2 29.5 70.5 46.5 30.3 69.7 49.5 
Japan 
 
46.6 53.4 33.3 49.7 50.3 35.7 47.0 53.0 38.3 - - - 
Netherlands 
 
34.2 65.8 56.4 37.0 63.0 49.9 45.6 54.4 42.7 51.4 48.6 48.4 
Norway 
 
- - - 32.0 68.0 47.7 31.6 68.4 40.7 33.0 67.0 42.7 
Spain 
 
37.6 62.4 38.8 33.0 67.0 43.0 36.2 63.8 47.9 35.7 64.3 43.7 
Sweden 
 
30.5 69.5 57.8 30.1 69.9 59.1 31.2 68.8 49.8 35.1 64.9 49.0 
United Kingdom 
 
31.2 68.8 44.3 30.2 69.8 40.6 33.3 66.7 38.5 36.5 63.5 45.5 
United States 
 
29.8 70.2 35.5 26.4 73.6 35.2 28.5 71.5 34.2 28.8 71.2 39.9 
Source: OECD  EO90 cit. Average data; GD = Discretionary spending; GN = Non-discretionary spending;  GY =             
   General Government Spending/Nominal GDP ratio. 
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This is much larger than the discretionary expenditure obtained from estimated residuals, but is 
much smaller than typically assumed in the earlier econometric models where government spending 
was by definition an exogenous, controlled, variable.  Moreover, although there are significant 
differences across countries, the share of non-discretionary spending (GN) is generally increasing 
over time and accounts for the rising ratio of total government spending to GDP (GY).  
Interestingly, this tendency is reversed in the Great Recession, with a significant increase in 
discretionary spending, especially in those countries  (Table 3) that entered the recession phase with 
less stringent debt constraints.17  
 Looking at the components of discretionary spending (Tables 2a,b), one can observe a 
similar pattern across countries: purchases are about the 60% of discretionary spending and are 
always and everywhere the largest component, generally increasing in the last period.  Capital 
spending ranks second, at about the 20% of the discretionary aggregate, with differences across 
countries reflecting unusual episodes (Ireland), or more structural patterns (US, Japan).  In all cases, 
subsidies are the third and smallest discretionary component, ranging between 5 and 10 percent. 
 The components of non-discretionary spending (GN) differ more markedly among countries, 
partially because social security – which is generally the largest component -  is  mostly made by 
pensions in Japan, France, Italy and Spain and by welfare expenditures in Northern Europe, in 
Ireland and in the United Kingdom. 
The gap between the first and the second ranking component (wages) is not as distant as the one 
found for discretionary spending. In some cases, compensations of employees exceed (or have 
about the same weight) than social security.  Finally, interest spending is the third, much smaller, 
component, though its share obviously reflects the size of government debt (Table 3). 
 
 
4.4 Persistence and volatility  
 
In this section we verify whether our priors on the selection of discretionary and non-discretionary 
components are confirmed by the analysis of the volatility and persistence of these two types of 
spending.  In Table 6 we compare the persistence and volatility statistics relative to both 
discretionary and non-discretionary government spending aggregates in each country.  Similarly to 
the single variable case (Tables 4.1-4.3 ), also aggregate data refer to HP-filtered cyclical variables.  
Regarding the comparison between primary and total government spending, the main finding is that 
discretionary spending (GD) is always more volatile than non-discretionary spending (GN), and 
                                                
17 This increase was particularly high in Ireland and, for different reasons in the Netherlands, where the discretionary 
share is always increasing, eventually reaching as in Japan about half of total outlays. 
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more volatile as well than primary and total government spending.  Furthermore, non-discretionary 
spending is generally less volatile than primary  (GP) and total government spending (GT).   
While total expenditure by definition cannot separate its components, it is interesting to note that 
primary spending – one of the first empirical proxies for discretion – does not comply with our 
criteria, since not only is more volatile than the GN aggregate, but it is often also more persistent. 
 
Table 6 – Persistence (LB) and volatility (Vol) of discretionary (GD), non-discretionary (GN), 
primary (GP) and total spending (GT) 
Austria 
1990-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB 
(3) = (1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Belgium 
1980-2011            
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB 
(3) =(1)/(2) 
Dvol 
Denmark 
1980-2011 
(1) 
Vol 
(2) 
LB 
(3) = (1)/(2) 
Dvol 
GD 4.28 5.03 .85 GD 3.54 17.3 .20 GD 2.16 8.1 .27 
GN 1.28 7.24 .18 GN 1.16 16.0 .07 GN 1.30 26.2 .05 
GP 1.55 7.77 .20 GP 1.62 12.9 .13 GP 1.31 28.2 .05 
GT 1.41 6.14 .23 GTOT 1.49 4.36 .34 GTOT 1.28 27.8 .05 
Finland 
1980-2011 
   France 
1980-2011 
   Iceland 
1990-2011 
   
GD 2.22 13.8 .16 GD .91 6.6 .14 GD 11.4 5.1 2.23 
GN 1.54 17.6 .09 GN .69 12.1 .06 GN 2.31 5.6 .41 
GP 1.14 13.5 .08 GP .61 3.8 .16 GP 5.77 3.9 1.48 
GT 1.22 23.1 .05 GT .56 10.5 .05 GT 5.34 4.5 1.17 
Ireland 
1990-2011 
   Italy 
1980-2011 
   Japan 
1980-2008 
   
GD 16.7 3.94 4.25 GD 2.90 16.4 .18 GD 2.88 12.3 .23 
GN 1.72 7.23 .24 GN 1.84 13.9 .13 GN 1.88 12.6 .15 
GP 7.7 2.80 2.75 GP 1.01 3.3 .30 GP 2.3 14.4 .16 
GT 7.34 2.90 2.53 GT 1.15 5.6 .20 GT 2.54 12.8 .20 
Netherlands 
1980-2011 
   Norway 
1980-2011 
   Spain 
1980-2011 
   
GD 3.87 11.3 .34 GD 1.79 26.2 .07 GD 3.46 14.6 .24 
GN 1.31 15.2 .09 GN 1.02 12.6 .08 GN 1.83 14.5 .13 
GP 1.97 12.9 .15 GP 1.11 26.4 .04 GP 1.93 23.6 .08 
GT 1.81 10.8 .17 GT 1.16 20.2 .06 GT 1.84 18.6 .10 
Sweden 
1980-2011 
   UK 
1980-2011 
   US 
1980-2011 
   
GD 3.33 11.3 .29 GD 4.05 10.5 .39 GD 1.83 12.7 .14 
GN .98 4.6 .21 GN 1.31 17.4 .08 GN .80 17.0 .05 
GP 1.57 11.8 .13 GP 1.87 9.9 .19 GP 1.23 24.6 .05 
GT 1.49 9.5 .16 GT 1.64 10.0 .16 GT .90 22.6 .04 
Source:  OECD EO90 cit.  All indicators refer to deflated cyclical deviations from an annual HP trend; Vol is the 
standard deviation of the cyclical data. LB(p) is the  Ljung-Box statistics where p = T/4 is the number of 
autocorrelations and T is the number of data points. The LB(p) statistics is used as an indicator of persistence;  Dvol = 
Vol/LB  is an indicator of deflated volatility, i.e. of the volatility not induced by the estimated persistence. 
 
However, as stated above, these results can also reflect the fact that, in any time-series process, 
volatility is increased by the propagation mechanism of the shocks, especially if they are persistent.  
Therefore, we deflated volatility from persistence.  Looking at the Dvol index, we see that the 
deflation procedure does not affect the volatility ranking:  the fact that discretionary spending 
volatility is still the highest in all cases but Norway confirms our priors even in a stronger way.  
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Furthermore, the persistence indicators, reported in Table 6, broadly support the volatility results, 
though in a weaker way.  In ten out of fifteen cases, the non-discretionary spending aggregate is 
more persistent then the discretionary aggregate. In the remaining cases, however, inertia in 
discretionary spending is either the same as non-discretionary spending (in Spain), or higher (in 
Belgium, Italy, Norway and Sweden). Looking at the individual variables in each country (Table 4), 
this result could either reflect a rising share of somewhat inertial purchases or the time needed to 
activate and complete fixed investment decisions.    
 
5.  Conclusions  
The Great Recession has revived the debate on the role of fiscal policy to support economic activity 
in the short run.  A large consensus on the need of exceptional fiscal stimuli has emerged.  Much of 
the debate has concentrated on the size of fiscal multipliers.  We believe that before deriving 
econometric results on the effects of fiscal interventions, a better measure of truly discretionary 
policy is needed.  This paper is a step in that direction.  
 We provide a measure of discretionary spending, which is defined on the basis of three 
features of expenditure that can be easily approximated for empirical purposes. First, the lack of 
inertia; second, the lack of prior obligations, and third, temporariness or reversibility.  Given the 
persistence of macroeconomic fluctuations, lack of inertia implies that discretionary spending 
variables should have a lower persistence than the other spending variables.  It is indeed implausible 
that discretion applies to anything that basically replicates what happened before. This (relative) 
discontinuity requires also that policymakers can escape from several obligations, far exceeding 
mere legal or institutional constraints.  These obligations reflect social contracts and political 
preferences. These two patterns finally imply that discretionary spending refers to temporary 
interventions, partially denying Milton Friedman dictum that nothing is so permanent as a 
temporary government program.  
 Persistence and volatility were evaluated using cyclical data in each country. Evaluating 
cyclical variables, persistence and volatility indicators strongly support the view that discretionary 
spending should be more volatile and less persistent than the other components of spending, which 
confirms that our purpose-oriented measure of discretionary spending is basically correct or at least 
consistent with our definition.  Indeed, discretionary spending is always more volatile than non-
discretionary spending.  To account for the interaction between volatility and persistence, we 
introduced a “deflated” volatility indicator, which corrects the persistence-induced variability by 
dividing the standard deviation of each cyclical variable by our persistence indicator.  The 
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correction confirms our priors, as the adjusted volatility of discretionary spending is found to be 
more volatile than non-discretionary spending in 14 out of 15 country cases.  Persistence results 
also supported our hypotheses, though in a weaker form, as we obtained five out of 15 cases in 
which non-discretionary spending is less persistent than discretionary spending.  We attributed this 
result to the presence of implementation lags for capital expenditure, an important component of 
discretionary spending.  
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Appendix: Data sources and variable definitions 
 
Data are from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 90 (December 2011). Except for GD, GN  and WELFARE (our 
definitions),  all variables and acronyms are those used by the OECD.   
 
NOMINAL VARIABLES: 
CGNW: Government final non-wage consumption expenditure  
CGW: Government final wage consumption expenditure 
IGAA: Government fixed capital formation 
SSPG: Social security benefits 
SUB: Subsidies to firms 
TKPG: Capital Transfers paid and other capital payments 
INTERESTS (GGINTP): gross government interest payments 
PENSIONS = old age + survivors spending cash benefits (Social expenditure database) 
WELFARE = Welfare spending (SSPG – Pensions) [Our definition]  
DEFLATORS:  
PCG: Government final consumption expenditure, deflator 
PCGW: Government final wage consumption expenditure, deflator 
PCP: Private final consumption expenditure, deflator 
PGDP: Gross domestic product, deflator, market prices 
PIG: Government fixed capital formation, deflator; PIT: Gross total fixed capital formation, deflator 
 
REAL VARIABLES:  
 
Using the nominal defnition:  CG = CGW + CGNW and the Oecd deflated total consumption variable (CGQ),  real 
purchases (CGNWQ) have been obtained using the definition CGNWQ = CGQ – CGWQ  where the real compensation 
of employees (CGWQ) is obtained by using the private consumption deflator: CGWQ =  CGW/ PCP (Fiorito, 1997). 
The other cases are explained in the paper. 
 
CGQ =  CGNWQ + CGWQ 
IGAAQ =  IGAA / PIG  
CGWQ =  CGW/ PCP 
TSUBQ = TSUB / PGDP 
SSPGQ = SSPG / PCP 
GDPQ = GDP / PGDP 
TKPGQ = TKPG / PIG 
PENSIONSQ = PENSIONS/PCP 
WELFAREQ = WELFARE / PCP 
GGINTQ = GGINT/PGDP 
 
AGGREGATE SPENDING:  
Aggregates in volume are obtained by summing the appropriate variable in volume. 
 
GD = IGAA + CGNW + TKPG + TSUB   
GN = SSPG + CGW + GGINTP.  
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